ABSTRACT Adversarial examples are the inputs to machine learning models that result in erroneous outputs, which are usually generated from normal inputs via subtle modification and seem to remain unchanged to human observers. They have severely threatened the applications of machine learning, especially in the areas with high-security requirements. Unfortunately, for this issue, there is neither unambiguous interpretation about the causes nor almighty defenses in spite of the increasing attention and discussions. Based on the distinguished statistical feature of Markov chain, an effective defense method is proposed in this paper by exploring the differences in the probability distributions of adjacent pixels between normal images and adversarial examples. Specifically, the concept of overall probability value (OPV) is defined to estimate the modification to an input, which can be used to preliminarily determine whether the input is an adversarial example or not. Furthermore, by calculating the OPV of an input and modifying its pixel value to destroy the potential adversarial characteristics, the proposed method can efficiently purify adversarial examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning has been developing rapidly and found promising applications in various fields. Because of the outstanding performance in image recognition and speech processing [1] , [2] , deep neural networks (DNNs) based machine learning models have been widely used in read-world applications, such as medical image processing, driverless vehicles, and malware detection. At the same time, the accompanying security issues have attracted increasing attention. For traditional attacks such as virus planting, information bomb and service refusing [3] on information systems, the defense measures are relatively mature, and many systematic and rigorous defense mechanisms have been built, which can make the damage controllable. However, due to the ambiguity of cause and diversity, the attacks from adversarial examples make the state-of-the-art intelligent information system based on machine learning face severe security challenges.
In 2014, Szegedy et al. [4] found that when well-designed, tiny perturbations were added to a normal image, the DNNs would output a wrong classification result with high confidence. This kind of specially crafted images are called adversarial examples [4] . Moreover, it is also found that one adversarial example can mislead DNNs with different parameters or structures which is called transferability. Fig. 1 shows an original clean image of a snail that is recognized correctly in (a), and two adversarial examples that are classified as a trilobite and a pillow both with 99.9% confidence in (b) and (c), respectively. Subsequently, Papernot et al. [5] found that the attack from adversarial examples exists not only in DNNs, but also in other machine learning algorithms such as Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, and k-Nearest Neighbor, and the transferability also appears among those different kinds of machine learning models. Later, Kurakin et al. [6] verified that the adversarial examples are not limited to text data, but also exist in physical world. They took a photo of a printed adversarial example by a cell-phone, then inputted it to the typical classification model, and the result still turned out to be wrong. Athalye et al. [7] used 3D printing to successfully print 3D adversarial examples, and reported that those 3D adversarial examples showed adversarial characteristics under different angles, distances, and illumination conditions. In addition, adversarial examples have also been discovered in semantic analysis [8] , speech recognition [9] , and malware detection [10] besides of computer vision. Therefore, it is believable that adversarial examples widely exist in various application fields of machine learning.
As for the formation mechanism of adversarial examples, there is no unified explanation. Basically, the primary process of generating adversarial examples includes two steps: firstly, calculating the influence of the input on the classification results of a trained classifier with fixed parameters (weights, offsets, etc.), and then modifying the input within a limited range to make the output close to the target falsified label. Szegedy et al. [4] considered the reason may be the high nonlinearity of machine learning models, while Goodfellow et al. [11] believed it should be the linear nature of neural networks. Also, some researchers attributed it to insufficient samples in high-dimensional space [12] . So far, many methods of generating adversarial examples have been proposed, which can be divided into white-box and black-box attack, according to whether the attacker knows the detailed structure and parameters of the targeted model [5] .
The emergence of adversarial examples enables malicious attackers to implement seriously covert attacks. For example, if a driverless vehicle suffers from this kind of changing traffic sign ''STOP'' into ''SLOW'' adversarial example attack, it will lead to innocent tragedies [26] . Therefore, how to effectively defend against adversarial examples and guarantee the security of the intelligent information system is a key issue. This paper proposes a novel defense called OPV-defense against adversarial examples based on Markov chain in computer vision. Specifically, we firstly construct a transition probability matrix of normal images from a training set, and then preliminarily estimate the degree of possible perturbations of an input image by calculating its overall probability value (OPV). After that, the pixel values of the input are modified in specialty according to the transition probability matrix and then a clean image that can be recognized correctly would be got. The OPV-defense is independent of the attack method or the classification model, which can be embed into the deployed classifier and combined with other defenses. The effectiveness of the proposed OPV-defense is finally validated on both MNIST [13] and ImageNet data sets [14] .
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
In this section, several typical attacks which we have used in our experiments and some major defenses are briefly introduced. For the convenience of reading, the important notations and terminologies used in this paper are introduced in advance as follows.
• X represents the input image, and x i represents the i-th pixel after converting the image into a vector.
• X adv represents the adversarial example.
• denotes the size of the perturbations added to the original image.
• ∇ X J(X, Y) represents the gradient of the cross entropy loss function of the neural network given input X and output Y with respect to X .
• Sign(A) represents the symbolic operation of each element a in matrix A. Sign (a)=1, if a >0; Sign (a)=−1, if a <0; Sign(a)=0, if a =0. The output has the same shape as A.
• Clip(X, x min , x max ) means truncating each element x in X , setting it to x max when x is greater than x max , and x min when x is less than x min , respectively.
• L p denotes p-norm that quantifies the distance metric between the adversarial example and the clean image. Formally, L p is calculated by
where N is the number of pixels, and p usually takes values of infinite, 0, 1 or 2. Generally, L ∞ evaluates the maximum degree of the modification on pixel values [11] , L 0 represents occupation ratio of the modified pixels in the image, L 1 is always used in image noise reduction and restoration [15] , and L 2 can be used to measure the visual quality of the generated image.
A. ATTACKING METHODS
1)
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [11] , FGSM is one of the simplest methods to generate adversarial examples by calculating the gradient of loss function with respect to the input and then modifying the original image X proportionally as given by
2) Basic iterative method (BIM) [6] , BIM is an improved variant of FGSM, which decomposes the single-step FGSM into K -step iterative process, thereby generating a stronger adversarial example. Formally, the adversarial example is computed as
3) Momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MIM) [16] , based on BIM, MIM introduces the concept of momentum M to generate more aggressive adversarial examples given by
where
and µ is a decay factor. 4) Jacobian-based Saliency Map Method (JSMA), JSMA is a method based on forward derivatives proposed by Papernot et al. [17] . It constructs a saliency map to characterize the effect of the input on the output, and then generates adversarial examples by iteratively modifying the input. 5) Carlini-Wagner (CW), CW is an efficient iterative optimization algorithm proposed by Carlini and Wagner [18] , which could find the adversarial examples with smaller perturbations. There are three types of CW methods, subjected to L 0 , L 2 and L ∞ constraint, respectively. In our experiments, the L 2 -CW method is used since it can generate more aggressive adversarial examples.
FGSM, BIM and MIM all use L ∞ norm to restrict the perturbations, and JSMA uses the L 0 norm. Since the size of has significant effect only in the L ∞ norm, so different size of is only discussed for FGSM, BIM and MIM attacks in our experiments.
B. DEFENSE METHODS
The defense against adversarial examples is mainly divided into three types: simple detection, input purification and enhancement of self-robustness. In the simple detection type, a detection module that determines whether the input is legal is attached to the classifier. If the input is detected to be illegal, the exception handling strategy will be executed. Some researchers have designed such classifiers based on the outputs of convolutional layers to determine whether they are adversarial examples [19] . However, the simple detection is usually not sufficient in many scenarios and some adversarial examples with very few modifications are hard to detect. Input purification is a pre-processing operation for input data. It deprives adversarial examples of harmful characteristics via some specific transformations, such as noise filtering, JPEG compression and pixel modification [20] . Enhancement of self-robustness aims to improve the model's robustness via adversarial training [21] , defense distillation [22] , thermometer coding training [23] , etc. But it is actually difficult to design a strategy to enhance the robustness of various types of models against all attacks before identifying the underlying cause of adversarial samples. Of course, these defenses are not antagonistic and can be combined in practical applications.
Although a lot of defense methods have been proposed, they are usually bypassed by new attacks shortly later [24] - [26] . Attack and defense become a process of circulatory evolution, so it is necessary to continuously develop and improve the defense mechanism. This paper introduces the theory of Markov chain into the defense, which has not been seen in the open literature, and proposes a novel kind of input purification defense. As the same type of defense, PixelDefend was proposed by Song et al. [12] using the PixelCNN model to purify adversarial examples. Their experimental results published in ICLR 2018 demonstrated that the recognition accuracy on the purified adversarial examples achieved 84% for MNIST dataset. By contrast, the accuracy on the OPV-defense proposed in this paper increases to above 90%. Moreover, for color images, the effectiveness of PixelDefend was only verified on the small size CIFAR-10 dataset with accuracy of 70%; while, our OPV-defense is verified on the large-scale ImageNet and obtains a recognition rate of above 70%.
III. THE OPV-DEFENSE BASED ON MARKOV CHAIN A. MARKOV CHAIN
Markov chain, also called Markov process, describes a sequence of discrete states in which the next state only depends on the current state and is independent of all previous states. This sequence of states can be represented as {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }. The set composed by the values of all possible states is called ''state space'' denoted by {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m }. At each step of Markov chain, a state may be transferred to another or maintain the current state, depending on a certain probability distribution. The probability of the transition from one state to another or itself is called transition probability and all probabilities among the whole states constitute a transition probability matrix. Let P t,t+1 represent the transition probability from current state S t to next state S t+1 . From the concept of Markov chain, it can be known that the transition probability has following properties,
Due to its distinctive and useful properties, Markov chain has been widely used in the fields of semantic recognition, machine translation, image feature detection [27] , etc. In this VOLUME 7, 2019 paper, Markov chain is incorporated to make a preliminary probability estimation of the input image.
B. DETECTION ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In general, most cameras generate digital images from real world by using interpolation technique to supplement pixels. The basic principle of interpolation algorithms is calculating the target pixel value by using its adjacent pixels based on the correlation between adjacent pixels of a normal image. In fact, it is believed that this correlation exists not only in the raw images but also in other pre-processed normal images [28] , [29] . Moreover, the approval and wide use of the interpolation principle also implies that the correlation between nearby pixels is stronger, while that is weaker between remote ones. In consequence, this kind of correlation can be used as an indicator to evaluate whether an image has been tampered with.
Motivated by Markov Chain that is composed of a series of discrete states with the same type, in this work, we simplify this correlation to the single-correlation, that is, each pixel is only related to its former pixel in the vector transformed from the image matrix. The simplest correlation depending on only two adjacent pixels is assumed mainly for the consideration of algorithm complexity, computational efficiency and compatibility with Markov chain theory. Thus, an image can be considered as a Markov Chain composed of pixels. Set each pixel to be a state and the values of the pixels form the state space. The change of the pixel values between adjacent pixels denotes the state transition. Then, we calculate the probability of occurrence of each adjacent pixel pair based on the training set, and construct a transition probability matrix of normal image sets. It is empirically shown that there is a certain probability distribution of the state transition for normal images, but for adversarial examples, such probability distribution attribute is changed inevitably. The specific processes are described as follows.
For a single-channel image, let H and W be the height and width, respectively, then it can be converted into a onedimensional vector X with length L = H * W in the horizontal direction. The corresponding state space of the Markov chain formed by the pixels takes discrete values from the range [0, 255] . Let i represent the value of current pixel x t , then the probability P i,j denotes the probability that the value of subsequent pixel x t+1 takes j, in other words, P i,j is the probability of appearance of pixel value pair (i, j) at an adjacent pixel position pair (x t , x t+1 ). According to the property of Markov chain, the state transition probability P i,j from x t to x t+1 is independent of t but dependents on i and j.
Based on the training set, the transition probability matrix P is given and calculated by
and N is the total number of samples from the training set, and x n t denotes the t-th pixel of the n-th sample vector. Besides, it is noted that 255 j=0 P i,j = 1.
Then, based on the transition probability matrix P, the OPV of an input image can be got by the following formula,
where P x 0 is the probability that the value of the first pixel in the training set appears. Since P i,j is less than 1, when L is large, the total product will become very small, even exceeding the computer precision. To avoid this problem, the product is further converted to,
Through experiments, we found that there are more adjacent pixel pairs with small probability on adversarial examples, thus the corresponding OPV in (10) becomes bigger than that of the normal image in general. Therefore, by calculating the OPV of an input image, one can preliminarily estimate whether the input has been disturbed and the degree of disturbance.
C. OPV-DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In most application scenarios, the simple detection is not enough. So, after the detection of adversarial examples, in this section, a novel defense, namely OPV-defense is designed to purify the disturbed image for correcting recognition result.
The basic idea of OPV-defense is to find proper x * t+1
with P x t,x * t+1 ≥ P x t,x t+1 and replace x t+1 with x * t+1 for each adjacent pixel pair (x t , x t+1 ) of the input, based on the transition probability matrix P. It should be noted that in order to ensure high-degree similarity, the adversarial example is obtained by subtly modifying the normal image within a limited range. Therefore, when purifying the adversarial example, the amendment on x t+1 also needs to be within a corresponding range (x t+1 − p , x t+1 + p ), where p is an estimate of . In addition, since the probability of an adjacent pixel pair in normal image is not always the largest in the corresponding range, here we set a threshold p th . Only when the probability is less than the threshold, the pixel x t+1 will be modified, and when replacing x t+1 , it is not optimal to choose the x * t+1 with the largest probability of pixel pair (x t , x * t+1 ) for some datasets. Certainly, the parameters p and p th are related to the degree of perturbations, so they can be functions of OPV. Since they are dynamically adjustable, the adaptability of the defense will be greatly improved.
The procedure of the proposed OPV-defense is described as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the transition probability matrix P of the normal samples from the training set;
Step 2: Initialize the output image X * using the input image X ;
Step 3: Calculate the OPV of the input X ;
Step 4: Determine the modifiable range p and the threshold p th ;
Step 5: Reset the value of the first pixel x 0 ;
Step 6: For each adjacent pixel pair ( ] , and obtain the probability that the current pair (x t , x t+1 ) appears in a series of possible pairs of (x t , x k ), k ∈ [m, n], which is denoted by p t ;
Step 7: If p t ≤ p th , update x * t+1 to a proper value via a specific strategy;
Step 8: Until the whole input image is processed.
It should be noted that we propose a universal framework of OPV-defense to purify adversarial examples and more specialized algorithms can be designed under this framework. Generally, the OPV of images from different datasets shows diverse properties. Since the estimation of p and p th and the selection of x * t+1 are all related to OPV, the specific defense algorithms for different datasets could be different. In fact, as the calculation formula of OPV is given, it is easy to customize these terms. Therefore, the proposed scheme possesses both universality and specificity for further optimization on different cases.
In next section, the OPV-defense will be applied and verified on typical image datasets.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
As we all known, MNIST and ImageNet datasets are the most typical datasets for image classification. In this section, firstly, the proposed OPV-defense is instantiated and verified on MNIST dataset associated with a three-layer convolutional neural network. Then our algorithm is evaluated on ImageNet dataset and InceptionV3 model [30] , and the results prove the feasibility of OPV-defense on color images and large-scale data sets. All the experiments were executed on one NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
In the following experiments, the adversarial examples are generated from several typical attack methods, including FGSM, BIM, MIM, JSMA, and CW with different degrees of perturbations. And these attacks are implemented by using the software library Cleverhans [31] that provides the related standardized attack modules. Since the white-box attack is more aggressive than black-box attack, this paper only considers the former attack.
A. OPV-DEFENSE FOR MNIST
For MNIST dataset, a three-layer convolutional neural network is used as the classification model, and the structure is shown in Table 1 . After training, the classification accuracy is 99.3%.
Based on the test set of MNIST, equal numbers of adversarial examples for each attack method are generated with accuracies (ACC) and norms listed in Table 2 , where the lower the accuracy is, the more aggressive the adversarial example is. The range of hyperparameter for MNIST is [0, 1]. Generally, adversarial examples will become more aggressive with increasing ε within a certain range; while, in order to guarantee the similarity between the adversarial example and the original image, ε should not be too large. So, when validating the effectiveness of defenses against adversarial examples, one can choose some proper ε values as representatives [12] , [21] . In our work, it is set to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Using those given , the attacks can generate adversarial examples with accuracies covering from 87% to 0.6%, which are sufficient to verify the effectiveness of OPV-defense on different perturbations. Besides, the corresponding L p norms are calculated to measure the distance metric between original images and adversarial examples.
TABLE 2. Accuracies and norms of adversarial examples for MNIST.
Since the original pixel value range of MINIST dataset is [0, 1], firstly, it is transformed to [0, 255] for the consideration of consistency, and the same to that of the adversarial examples. Then statistics on the probability distributions of all adjacent pixel pairs of normal images (all images from MNIST test set) and adversarial examples are drawn in Fig. 2 , which show that most of the pixel pairs' probabilities of normal images fall into the high probability region, while those of adversarial examples are shifted to the low probability region. The red part in Fig. 2(a) is the probability distribution of adversarial examples (FGSM, = 0.1), which is similar to the rest cases of FGSM, BIM and MIM. Fig. 3 shows the comparisons of the OPV distributions of normal images (Test Set) and adversarial examples generated from FGSM, BIM, MIM, JSMA and CW methods. It can be seen that there are obvious segmentations between them ( Fig. 3(a)-(c) ). Therefore, if a threshold value between them is set, the adversarial examples can be distinguished from the normal images by comparing the OPV of the input with the threshold. However, Fig. 3(d) demonstrates that most part of the OPV distribution of the normal image and the adversarial examples generated from JSMA overlaps, so the OPV does not work for detecting adversarial attack from JSMA. As for the reasons, by observing the norm in table 2, we find that the L 0 norm for the JSMA is significantly smaller than other attacks. That is, the number of pixels modified by JSMA is too limited to have enough impact on the OPV of the image, and this is also confirmed by Fig. 2(b) .
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Since the attack method is usually unknown in practice, if theOPV of an input is much large than the aforementioned threshold, it can be concluded that the input has been tampered with. But when the OPV of an input is normal, it does not mean the input is clean, because it may be an adversarial example generated from the attack that restricts the L 0 constraint. Therefore, after the preliminary detection, the proposed OPV-defense is used to purify possible adversarial examples for intelligent recognition systems.
The basic framework of OPV-defense has been presented before, but for different datasets, the specific strategy, parameters and calculations formulas can be different. The OPV-defense for MNIST is described in Algorithm 1. As for the parameter p , it is found as in Fig. 3 that the OPVs of adversarial examples do not increase with the increasing . The reason lies in that the difference between adjacent pixel values is relatively large in MNIST dataset, so the adversarial example generated using bigger is more similar to the normal image. Here, we set the pixel modification range p =255 * OPV MAX /OPV X , where OPV MAX is the maximum OPV of the test set. For the threshold p th , since it is positively correlated with OPV, it is set as λ * OPV, where the best results are obtained when λ = 6.25 * 10 −5 . In addition, seen from Fig. 2(a) , the probability of most pixel pairs in MNIST is the largest, so the candidate pixel with the maximum probability within the modifiable range will be selected when choosing x * t+1 .
Algorithm 1 OPV-Defense for MNIST
Input: one-dimensional image vector X , pre-calculated transition probability matrix P, and pre-calculated x 0 , which is the first pixel that appears most frequently. However, during the purification, some noise will be introduced unintentionally, so a median filtering operation is performed subsequently. Fig. 4 demonstrates the original image, adversarial examples, purified results, and the images after subsequent filtering. It can be seen that the images after purified are already visually similar to the normal one. Although the images look more different from the original after subsequent filtering operation, the accuracy gets further increase. This may exhibit the difference in recognition between human and classifier, which may be eliminated in future.
The accuracy on the purified images is presented in Table 3 . The worst accuracy on the adversarial examples before purification is almost 0. But after purification, all the accuracies significantly increase to above 87%, where, the best is for CW method, the accuracy is about 99.2%; while the worst is for MIM but still has the accuracy 87.55%. Then after the median filtering, most of the test accuracies are further improved, for example, it even grows to 92% for the worst case of JSMA method. At the same time, for normal images, due to a series of purification processes, the accuracy is slightly reduced, but remains at an acceptable level, namely above 98%. It can be seen that the accuracy on processed images increases with decreasing , then if a lower is used to validate OPV-defense, it should also obtain satisfactory results because of the less aggressiveness of adversarial examples and our -sensitive algorithm. If a higher than 0.3 is used, the generated adversarial examples will become too different from the original images, so we do not consider this case.
In Fig. 5 , the red part in each subfigure denotes the OPV distributions of the test set and the adversarial examples from FGSM, BIM, MIM, JSMA and CW, respectively, and the green part corresponds to the purified images. It can be seen that this algorithm effectively shifts the OPV of the input images to the high probability region, which verifies the basic theory of our defense algorithm.
B. OPV-DEFENSE FOR ImageNet
Although MNIST dataset is one of the most typical datasets for classification, it is small and the target category is only ten, many defenses feasible on it do not work on largescale datasets. In this section, our OPV-defense is further tested on ImageNet dataset and InceptionV3 classification
Algorithm 2 OPV-Defense for ImageNet
Input: one-dimensional image vector X , pre-calculated transition probability matrix P Output: purified image X * 1: Initialize X * ← X 2: Compute OPV X (OPV of image X ) 3: Compute p = 255 * η * OPV X and p th = 2
: end if 10: end for model. ImageNet contains more than 14 million images covering more than 20,000 categories. We randomly selected 125,000 images from ImageNet as the training set, and randomly selected 1000 images that are not in the training set as the test set. With regard to the size of training set, we found that the transition probability matrix tends to be stable when the number of training images exceeds 100,000, so we empirically selected 125,000 images as the training set.
Different from the single channel images (gray images) from MNIST dataset, those from ImageNet are three channel images (RGB images). Therefore, the total OPV is actually the sum of the OPV of three channels. Fig. 6 shows the probability distributions of adjacent pixel pairs of normal images and adversarial examples (FGSM, = 8) from ImageNet. It can be seen that there are great differences with that of MNIST shown in Fig. 2 . The image size of ImageNet is much larger, the color is more abundant, and the pixel changes are smoother. As a result, probabilities of the adjacent pixel pairs are distributed more evenly. Therefore, we keep the first pixel value unchanged and randomly select x * t+1 from the permissible range [m, n] according to the probability of each pixel pair(x t , k), k ∈[m, n]. Fig. 7 shows the OPV distributions of the test set and adversarial examples, where the green part corresponds to the test set, and the red, yellow and blue parts correspond to the adversarial examples with of 8, 16 and 24, respectively.
Unlike the case for MNIST, it can be found that the OPV of the ImageNet increases with , which is related to the smoother pixel value change of the images. In the following VOLUME 7, 2019 experiments, p is estimated by 255 * η * OPV X , where the best results are obtained when η = 3.7 * 10 −7 .
As for the threshold p th , it can be observed that the OPV distributions of the test set and adversarial examples cannot be partitioned easily. Therefore, a more complex strategy is designed to determine p th as given by
where µ and σ are the mean and the order magnitude of the OPV of normal images, respectively. For the consideration of computation efficiency, the adversarial examples were generated from FGSM, BIM, MIM, and CW methods. The norms are listed in Table 4 . Similarly, a median filtering operation is performed after purification to remove the unintentional noise. The algorithm of OPV-defense for ImageNet is presented as follows. images are basically consistent with the original image and the accuracy is greatly improved, as presented in Table 5 . And when the input is an original clean image, OPV-defense would make a few modifications to the image. Here, we use the TOP5 correct rate as the recognition accuracy. It denotes that if the top 5 predictions (with the highest probabilities) include the target label, the recognition is considered to be correct. The best purification effect is for BIM ( = 8) with accuracy increasing from 4.1% to 85.2%, and for the worst case (MIM, = 24), the accuracy also increases from 2.5% to 70.8%, which verify the effectiveness of OPV-defense.
C. DISCUSSION
Compared with other purification defenses such as noise filtering, JPEG compression and PixelDefend, OPV-defense firstly evaluates the degree of possible perturbations of an input, then calculates the dynamic parameters p th and p to determine whether to modify the pixel and the modification range, while the others are usually implemented with fixed super parameters. When the input is an adversarial example, OPV-defense modifies most of the pixels, and when the input is a normal clean image, OPV-defense just makes a few modifications. Accordingly, OPV-defense is more effective for varied inputs than others.
We also consider the ability of OPV-defense resisting potential attacks. Generally speaking, the vicious attack against a specific defense will use certain constraints to restrict the key factors used in the defense to bypass it. For example, if an attack specifically generates some adversarial examples with restricted OPV, then the simple detection method based on the comparison of the OPV of input with the threshold would fail. But the effectiveness of OPV-defense has been verified by experiments even for the adversarial example with OPV falling into the distribution region of normal images. Therefore, this kind of attack cannot disable our OPV-defense.
Efficiency is an important factor determining the capability of an algorithm in practical applications. However, for the defenses against adversarial examples, most of the attention focuses on the accuracy at present, and there are very few discussions about time and memory cost in published literature. As far as we know, [12] declares that their PixelDefend averagely can process 3.6 images per second on one NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU for Cifar-10 (image size 3×32×32). While OPV-defense processes 65 images per second for MNIST (image size 28×28) and 0.4 images per second for ImageNet (most of image size 3×299×299) on average. Given the difference in image size and GPU performance, OPV-defense possesses higher processing speed besides of higher accuracy. For memory cost, OPV-defense algorithm occupies a small amount of memory itself and it only needs a little extra space to store the transition probability matrix (the size is not greater than 3×256×256), so the total memory overhead is still very small.
In this paper, the one-dimensional image vector is generated in the horizontal (row) direction, and certainly, there are other directions one can use, such as vertical (column), diagonal. At the same time, due to computational efficiency, we assume that the current pixel is only related to its former pixel, but other assumptions can also be made. For example, one pixel could be related to its former two pixels, the surrounding 8 pixels or other cases. In future work, we will further study the feasibility and even improvements of our scheme under these assumptions.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel defense algorithm (OPVdefense) based on Markov chain and probability and statistics theories, which can effectively defend advanced adversarial attacks. Firstly, the transition probability matrix of normal images is constructed and then the OPV is defined to measure whether an input image has been tampered with. By calculating theOPV of the input, one can effectively detect the adversarial examples with large L 0 norm. Then, the OPV-defense is designed, which can purify adversarial examples by modifying the pixel values of the input to push the OPV back into high probability region. In order to verify the effectiveness and advantages of our OPV-defense, a variety of adversarial examples were generated with state-of-the-art attack methods. OPV-defense was tested on MNIST dataset, increasing the accuracy to over 92%. Further, we evaluated OPV-defense on large scale ImageNet dataset that is not validated on by many other defend methods, and obtained accuracy above 70%. OPV-defense is attack-agnostic and model-agnostic, so it can be applied to any classification model and combined with other defend methods to improve robustness of the model.
In addition, Markov Chain has natural advantages in dealing with the data with special statistical characteristics and correlation, so there is a possibility for OPV-defense to be extend to other fields, such as spelling check, translation in natural language processing. 
